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COMMENT ON LYNCH
MICHAEL B. MUKASEY*
I am probably the least appropriate person to be commenting on the topic
of policing corporate misconduct.  My job as a district court judge is only to
take what Professor Lynch’s former colleagues in the prosecutor’s office bring
me, provide an arena for the dispute, bury the bodies when it is over, and clean
up the arena for the next set of combatants.  Therefore, I should not have a
view on the more general topic, but I do.  So, for what it is worth, I will share it
with you.
First, despite the blurring of lines that Professor Lynch’s article1 points out
at the extremes and at the edges, the issue is still pretty clear.  There is a bright
line distinction between civil and criminal cases and the distinction is one word,
with four letters: JAIL.
I can recall being involved in a representation of people in a price-fixing in-
vestigation in the wiring device business.  The investigation plodded along as
antitrust investigations will do, but when there was a perceived shift from a civil
to a criminal investigation, there was a palpable difference in the atmosphere.
The prospect of paying fines, even of personal liability, was one thing.  The
prospect of spending time in jail was something quite different.  And, as could
be expected, once jail was a possibility, all the schoolyard rationalizations came
out in a great tumble: “What did we do?  We didn’t kill anybody; we didn’t rape
anybody; people do much worse; and everybody else is doing it.”  All the things
we have heard for ages and generations came tumbling out in a rush.  There
was a very strong and obvious distinction.
Distinguishing between the kinds of behavior that are prosecuted criminally
and those that are not is a long-standing problem.  Criminal statutes have never
been enforced with equal vigor.  There are always campaigns of one kind or
another to crack down on different misbehaviors.  By and large, this system of
enforcement has worked tolerably well, probably due to an important point I
hope does not get lost: Most people do not need the criminal law to tell them
what to do and what not to do.  People who do need it are, if nothing else, put
on edge because of the randomness of the possibility that they might at some
point engage the attention of the authorities.
In my own court some years ago, a prosecutor decided it would be helpful
to have routine narcotics cases enforced in federal court.  So one day a week
(no one knew in advance which day it was) was “federal day,” and all the drug
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dealers and street corner dealers were picked up and taken to the federal court
where they got a horse doctor’s dose of reality.
Although this practice of selective prosecution and selective federalization
of some misbehaviors has been with us a long time, and seems to be working
fairly well, I do think we need to be careful about who makes these types of
prosecutorial decisions.  I am not suggesting that the decisionmaking authority
should reside anywhere other than the prosecutor’s office, but I am suggesting
that even prosecutors’ offices should employ some type of Archer Daniels
Midland style of control.2  That is, to assure that experienced people, who have
been “out there” for a while, and who have had to say “please” and “thank
you” get to make the decisions, not simply people who are two or three years
out of law school.  When it comes to making human decisions, these inexperi-
enced attorneys lack a certain level of experience and judgment possessed by
people who have been around a while longer.
The extent I detect any suggestion that we ought to have objective stan-
dards, I am experiencing a very haunting and uncomfortable feeling.  I feel that
we have returned to a time about a dozen or fifteen years ago, when there was
a discussion about the randomness of the results in the criminal law and how
there was perceived unfairness and how apparently similar cases were being
treated differently.  As a result of that discussion, we were given the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, which are now celebrating, if that is the right
word, their tenth year.  There are two notable things about the celebration:
First, as far as I know, the celebration is occurring only at the United States
Sentencing Commission, and, second, as parties go, it is mighty quiet.
It is a nice academic aim to create a rigorous set of standards to control de-
cisions about human behavior, and I am in favor of conferences to discuss such
topics in warm places during cold weather and cold places during warm
weather.  But, let us not have any illusions; ultimately it comes down to intelli-
gent, experienced people making intelligent decisions.  The transparency comes
in the cases themselves.  If the wrong kinds of cases are being brought, or if
cases are being brought that the public cannot tolerate or cases are not being
brought that the public demands, the press and political campaigns can take
care of such problems.  What nobody can take care of is a legislative system
that gets completely out of hand with a set of “objective standards.”  Although
repeal of the sentencing guidelines is a dream that may be in the minds of some
guerrillas up in the mountains, it ain’t going to happen.  Before we have a set of
prosecutorial guidelines, then, I would urge everybody to be very, very careful.
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